How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community? by Bensassi, Sami & Martínez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy
for the International Community?
Sami Bensassi and Inmaculada Mart´ınez-Zarzoso
Universitat Jaume I, University of Goettingen
2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27134/
MPRA Paper No. 27134, posted 1. December 2010 15:16 UTC
1 
 
How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the 
International Community? 
Sami Bensassi
 **
 and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso 
*
  
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the impact of maritime piracy on international trade. Piracy increases the cost of 
international maritime transport through an increase in insecurity regarding goods deliveries. Bilateral 
trade flows between the main European and Asian countries over the 1999 to 2008 period are used to 
estimate an augmented gravity model that includes various measures of piracy acts. We found robust 
evidence indicating that maritime piracy reduces the volume of trade; the effect of ten additional vessels 
hijacked being associated to an 11% decrease in exports. Using these results, the international cost of 
piracy in terms of trade destruction is estimated to be 28 billion dollars. Finally, we compare the cost of 
low intensity conflict like Somalia, to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to the cost of an 
autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year 2008.The results indicate that the 
cost of war more than doubles the cost of low intensity conflict. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International maritime piracy is a growing phenomenon, particularly in its 
disruption of the main trade route linking Europe and Asia. According to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in 2009 Somali pirates hijacked 47 vessels, 
took 867 crewmembers hostage and carried out no less than 217 violent attacks on 
ships. All this took place after the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) passed a 
resolution authorizing the deployment of a sizeable naval force in the region to protect 
ships and their crews. From the economic point of view, piracy affects international 
trade through an increase in insecurity related to the prompt delivery of the goods 
transported.  
Recent research has dealt with various sources of insecurity (corruption, piracy, 
terrorism) by modelling the long-term effect insecurity has on trade (Anderson 2008; 
Anderson and Bandiera 2006; Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, 2005). Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) have made the point that inadequate institutions constrain trade far 
more than tariffs do. Empirical analysis in this area has focused on the impact of violent 
acts such as terrorism, civil wars and external conflicts on trade (Nitsch and 
Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Mirza and Verdier, 2008 and De Sousa, 
Mirza and Verdier, 2009). In this paper, however, we focus on the impact of maritime 
piracy on trade, which has not yet been studied, at least to our knowledge. The main 
advantage in doing this is that it allows us to cover a gap in the literature by addressing 
violent acts in third-party countries’ waters, as Mirza and Verdier (2008) suggested.  
Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport since higher premiums must 
be paid to crews sailing through dangerous waters, and the cost of insuring the goods 
shipped also increases. Alternatively traders can adopt longer and costlier trade routes 
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or change to alternative means of transport (products with a high value/weight ratio 
could switch to air-freight). The longer route around the Cap of Good Hope is an option 
considered by maritime companies, but it was not used before 2008, and only very 
scarcely since (Bendall, 2010).  
Data scarcity may partly explain why we have been unable to locate any studies 
estimating the effects of piracy on trade. For the purposes of this paper, however, we 
have used new data on piracy attacks supplied by the International Piracy Center (IPC) 
and empirical research that increasingly introduces accurate measures of insecurity into 
gravity equations (e. g. Marcouiller, 2000; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Nitsch and 
Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Mirza and Verdier, 2008; Wilmsmeier 
and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2010).  
Our aim is twofold: On the one hand we estimate the impact of maritime piracy on 
maritime trade between Europe and Asia using data on incidents of piracy between 
1999 and 2008. In doing so, we account for omitted variable biases and control 
appropriately for potential endogeneity between acts of piracy and trade. We also 
investigate whether there has been any substitution effect between transport modes as a 
consequence of escalating maritime piracy. On the other hand, we estimate the cost of 
maritime piracy and compare it to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to 
the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year 
2008.  
According to our findings, the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked is associated to 
an 11% decrease in exports and the international trade-related-cost of piracy is 
estimated to be around 28 billion dollars. The results indicate that the estimated cost of 
war almost doubles the cost of low intensity conflict. 
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The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we review the related literature on 
insecurity and international trade; in section 3 we present the data used and some 
descriptive statistics; in section 4 we outline our model, empirical estimation and our 
main results; in section 5 we discuss the cost of modern maritime piracy for the 
international community and in section 6 we present our conclusions and ideas for 
further research. 
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2. INSECURITY AND TRADE 
It is a widely accepted assumption that insecurity decreases trade opportunities. As 
noticed by Anderson (2008) most of us lived in a more or less 'predatory world', which 
makes it surprising that few papers have tried to determine to which extent trade is 
lowered by insecurity. 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2005), Anderson and Bandiera (2006) and Anderson (2008) 
have modelled theoretically the conditions under which endogenous transactions costs, 
due to criminal activities like piracy, will destroy trade. Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2005) show how difficult it is for countries to abandon autarky and open up to trade 
when no institutions are available to protect transactions. Anderson and Bandiera (2006) 
developed a simple model for contract enforcement carried out by an exogenous agent, 
such as the mafia or private police forces. Anderson (2008) applies the same conceptual 
framework to show how merchants can organize through guilds or granted monopolies 
to protect their transactions.  
Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), have used the gravity model 
of trade to research empirically the extent to which insecurity deters trade. We have 
chosen to follow the same strategy in this paper. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) used 
institutional measures to determine the degree of security enjoyed by a particular 
country. They differentiate between transparency (measures declared to be taken to fight 
insecurity) and enforceability (the measures, among the former, which are actually 
carried out). They found that the more transparency the highest the trade volume. In an 
unpublished paper based on an earlier version of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), 
Marcouiller (2000) investigates whether insecurity problems affect all type of goods in 
the same fashion. Using Rauch’s classification (1999) that splits goods into 
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homogenous, price-referenced goods and differentiated goods, the author finds that 
insecurity affects trade whatever the type of good. When differentiating between 
contract insecurity and the prevalence of crime and theft, however, trade in 
homogeneous goods appears to be more vulnerable to crime and theft, whereas trade in 
differentiated goods is more sensitive to contract insecurity. Marcouiller (2000) defines 
piracy and hijacking as stealing merchandise in order to sell it illegally. But this kind of 
criminal activity, in spite of being frequent in many ports, is only weakly related to the 
type of piracy we are concerned with in this paper, which mainly involves the hijacking 
of a ship and its crew. The chief economic motive behind these hijackings is to obtain a 
substantial ransom for the crew, the ship and its cargo, not to sell the looted goods. The 
variables used by Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) measure 
merchandise security at the start and end points of the journey. They do not deal with 
security failures during the course of the journey, such as those involving acts of piracy. 
This paper addresses this particular issue by using data on maritime piracy. 
Refining the analysis initiated by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2004), distinguish several types of violent 
acts: terrorism, civil wars, external conflicts, riots and uprisings. They find each of these 
to have a significant negative impact on bilateral trade. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) 
find bilateral trade to drop by 4% if a country experiences a 100% rise in terrorist 
activity, while Bloomberg and Hess (2004) find that a single terrorist attack leads to a 
7.6% decline in that country’s bilateral trade. Both studies conclude that external and 
internal armed conflicts have a greater impact on trade than terrorism does. Mirza and 
Verdier (2008) and De Sousa, Mirza and Verdier (2009) focus exclusively on terrorist 
activities. The first of these studies highlights the specificities of terrorism and their 
relevance for the strategy used to estimate its effect on bilateral trade. Terrorist acts are 
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directional since they are perpetrated against the interests of a targeted nation by 
individuals of a perpetrator nation on the soil of the targeted nation, the perpetrator 
nation, or a third country. Hence terrorist acts have an impact on the bilateral trade 
relations between the targeted nation and the perpetrator nation, as well as between the 
neighbouring countries of the perpetrator nation and the targeted nation. Terrorist 
attacks also have a direct impact on the GDP of the targeted nation, and measures 
undertaken to fight terrorism impact bilateral trade. Moreover, the incidence of terrorist 
activity depends on the security measures undertaken to prevent it and on the extent to 
which modern economies are made vulnerable by their openness. To assess the impact 
of terrorism on bilateral trade, the global effect of trading with a terrorist country must 
be differentiated from the effect of bilateral terrorism on trade. Consequently, the 
endogeneity problems resulting from the effects of terrorism on GDP, and of security 
measures on terrorism must be taken into account. Mirza and Verdier (2008) single out 
the case of the impact of terrorism on imports to the United States (US) from countries 
in which terrorism against the US originates. In order to circumvent the problem created 
by the impact of security measures on bilateral trade, they use terrorist incidents 
targeting the US located in a third-party country (neither the US nor the perpetrator’s 
country). They found that a 1% increase in terrorism reduces US imports from the 
perpetrator’s country by around 0.01 %.   
Modern maritime piracy differs from terrorism in several respects. Attacks occur on 
route instead of being directed against a particular country. According to Mejia and al 
(2009) pirates do not choose their targets according to the origin of the ships. They do, 
however, try to avoid ships sailing under the flag of a country with a naval force in the 
area (Kiourktsoglou and Coutroubis, 2010). Piracy may have a significant impact on 
GDP of the trading countries through a drop in trade, but its impact through asset 
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destruction or enhanced security measures is minimal. Conversely, the latter do have an 
impact on the amount and nature of piracy. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.1. A Geography of Maritime Trade and Piracy 
Our source of data on piracy incidents is the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Live 
Piracy Report. It provides data on all Piracy and Armed Robbery incidents reported to 
the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. The IMB is a specialized division of the International 
Chamber Of Commerce (ICC) established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight 
against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. Piracy suppression is one of the 
IMB’s main areas of expertise, the alarming rise in incidents having led to the creation 
of the Kuala Lumpur-based IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992. It maintains a round-
the-clock watch over the world’s shipping lanes, reporting pirate attacks to local law 
enforcement agencies and issuing warnings about piracy hotspots to shippers.  
Figure 1 shows the main maritime routes in 2002. Most of the traffic connects the most 
economically powerful regions: North America-Europe, North America-Asia, and 
Europe-Asia. Routes linking Europe and Asia have the particularity of using specially 
narrow passages: the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab el Mandab 
between Yemen and Djibouti and the Straits of Malacca between Sumatra and 
Malaysia. These passages suffer congestion problems and the countries flanking them 
are often politically unstable. 
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Figure 1. Map of Maritime Shipping Routes in 2002 
In recent years, incidents of piracy acts have occurred in the vicinities of the Malacca 
and Bad el Mandab Straits, as well as in the Gulf of Aden along the shores of Somalia 
(See Figure 2). Somalia continues to endure a protracted civil war and is one of the most 
politically unstable countries in the world; the region of the Malacca Straits contains 
many small islands where the Indonesian government has no real control and which can 
be easily used by pirates as safe-havens. Merchandise being transported between Europe 
and Asia is, therefore, frequently endangered by piracy, be it in the Gulf of Aden or in 
Indonesian waters. 
Figure 2. Map of the Locations of Piracy Acts in 2008 
In order to examine the extent of the problem posed by piracy to shipping between 
Europe and Asia, and to determine differences in levels of danger by region, we have 
divided the oceans between the two continents into five regions: the European Seas (ES) 
from the coastal areas of Iceland and Norway in the North to the waters of the Canary 
Islands in the South, in addition to the Mediterranean and Black Seas; the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden (RSGA) which includes a vast area of the Indian Ocean along the shores 
of Oman, Somalia and Tanzania; the Indian Sub-Continental Seas (ISBS) along the 
shore of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ceylon and the Maldives; the South-East-Asian 
Seas (SEAS) comprising the waters of Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as those of 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia; and lastly the East-Asian Seas 
(SEC) which encompasses the Yellow Sea between China and Korea, the East and 
South China Seas, and the Japanese coasts . 
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Figure 3. Maritime Regions 
A ship heading from a port in northern Europe to China must cross all five maritime 
regions; four if it stops its journey in Singapore and three if it unloads its shipment in 
Mumbai. We have been able to count the number of incidents of piracy occurring 
annually in each of the five regions between 1997 and 2008, as well as the number of 
incidents on three different routes linking Europe and Asia over a 12-year period (see 
Table A.1 and Graph A.1 in the Appendix).  
We differentiate between three kinds of incident according to the extent to which the 
ship’s journey is disrupted: Attempted acts of piracy, boardings and hijackings. An 
attempted piracy act occurs when pirates board a ship and abandon it empty-handed 
after being discovered, or in instances in which a ship is fired upon without being 
stopped. Instances of boardings entail actual boarding of a ship by pirates and theft 
(generally the personal belongings of the crew and/or goods carried for crew 
maintenance and en-route ship repairs). These incidents may involve violence against 
the crew. The last type of piracy act, hijacking, consists in the seizure of the ship and its 
crew, the immobilization of the ship in a coastal area under the control of the pirates and 
a ransom being demanded in exchange for the crew members, the ship and its cargo. It 
is most obviously hijackings that are the most disruptive for maritime trade. Table 1 
shows the quantitative evolution of piracy incidents over time. It is worth noting the 
sharp increase in hijackings in 2008 in comparison to previous years. 
Table 1. Number of piracy acts by type on the Europe-East Asia Route 
3.2. Variables 
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In this section we set out the variables used in our empirical work, focusing on our 
target variable: piracy incidents. Sources and variable definitions are listed in Table A.2. 
Four of these variables concern piracy incidents: t_tot represents all piracy incidents 
(attempted boardings and successful ones) on a particular route, t_attempt is for all 
failed boarding attempts, t_boarded  we use for incidents in which a ship has been 
boarded but not hijacked, and finally t_hijack stands for hijacked ships. We expect the 
t_tot to correlate negatively with bilateral maritime trade. Moreover, we expect that the 
more disruptive acts of piracy (hijackings) to have a greater negative impact on bilateral 
maritime trade. 
Our other variables are classical variables for gravity equations: distance (Distij), is 
expected to be negatively related to bilateral maritime trade, colonial links (Colonyij) 
and common official language (Comlang_off) are expected to be positively related to 
bilateral maritime trade. The GDPs per capita and populations of the importer and 
exporter (Yhi, Yhj and Popi, Popj respectively) are used as control variables as suggested 
in the gravity model literature. We expected GDPs per capita to be positively related to 
bilateral maritime trade and populations to be negatively related to maritime trade. A 
summary of the statistics used is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Statistical Summary  
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
4.1. Model Specification 
The gravity model of trade is currently the most widely accepted framework for 
modeling bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). In it, bilateral trade levels are 
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usually related to the nominal incomes and populations of the countries involved, to the 
distance between economic centres of both, and to a number of trade impediments and 
facilitation variables. Dummy variables, such as former colonies, common language, or 
a common border, are generally used as proxies for these factors. The gravity model has 
been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or geographical 
variables in bilateral trade flows. In this case we use incidents of piracy on a given route 
to augment the traditional model, adding alternatively number of attempts, boarded 
ships, hijacks or total number of incidents to the trade hindering variables. Introducing 
time variation the augmented gravity model is specified as 
 (1),                                    
where Xijt are the exports from country i to country j in period t in current US$; YHi 
(YHj) indicates the GDP per capita of the exporter (importer), Popi (Popj) expresses 
exporter (importer) populations, Distij is geographical distances between countries i and 
j, and Fij represents other factors hindering or facilitating trade (e.g., common language, 
a colonial relationship, or being landlocked). Piracyijt is the number of piracy incidents 
on the trade route linking the two countries i and j. 
Lags are included in the model along with piracy variables, as incidents of piracy will 
affect decisions for shipping in the following years. In this manner we hope to avoid 
inverse causality issues, as incidents of piracy may be expected to be higher in crowded 
sea lanes, where traffic is dense and the possibilities for attacking vessels are greater.  
The model is generally estimated in log-linear form. Using logarithms for 
Equation 1, the gravity model is specified as follows. 
                 (2), 
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where L expresses variables in natural logs, the other explanatory variables having been 
described above. 
t are specific time effects that control for omitted variables common to all 
trade flows but which vary over time, they could be a proxy for the business cycle. δij 
are trading-partner fixed effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. When 
these effects are specified as fixed effects, the influence of the variables that are time 
invariant cannot be directly estimated. This is the case for distance; common language, 
colonial links and landlocked countries- therefore, its effect is subsumed into the 
country dummies. Since the variable of interest is piracy incidents, and variability is 
mainly over time, in some estimations we replace the time dummies by a trend.  
Considering that it may take some time before insecurity fully affects trade, we 
include the second lag for the different types of piracy incidents in our model.  
Continuing with our analysis we consider a modification to include the value of 
air trade as an additional regressor. This second specification which accounts for air 
trade in a panel data framework is given by 
 
               (3), 
where LXairij is the value in US$ of air trade between i and j in year t, and εijt expresses 
the error term that is assumed to be well behaved. The other variables are the same as in 
Equation 2, above. 
Finally, we estimate Model 3 for each specific route, to investigate whether the number 
of incidents has a different impact on each route. 
4.2. Main results 
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Models 1 and 2 are estimated for annual exports from 27 European Union (EU) 
countries to 20 Asian countries and Australia (Table A.3) for a 12 year period (1997-
2008). Table 3 shows the results obtained when equation 2 is estimated for all trade 
routes with hijacks as the target variable. Preliminary results indicate that the only 
variable that is statistically significant is the number of hijacks, whereas the number of 
attempts, number of boarded vessels and total number of incidents are not statistically 
significant for all specifications. We were not able to control for time effects common to 
all trade flows in the results for all trade routes (Table 3) because they are collinear with 
the number of incidents, which main source of variability is over time.  
After trying different specifications, it was the second lag of the number of hijacks that 
was found to be most relevant, further lags not being statistically significant. The model 
was first estimated using simple OLS for the pooled data (Baseline) and using random 
(M1) and fixed effects (M2) for each specific trading pair. As possible refinements we 
also estimated a fixed effect model corrected for autocorrelation (M3), another fixed 
effect model with standard errors corrected also for spatial cross-correlations (M4) and 
two dynamic models estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM): one 
estimated with the variables in levels (M5) and a second model with the variables in 
first differences (M6). A Hausman test indicates that the country-pair effects are 
correlated with the error term and therefore only the fixed effects specification is 
consistent. 
In all models, the coefficient estimated for the number of hijacks is negative and 
statistically significant at standard levels. As expected, an increase in number of attacks 
hinders exports. Since the results in models 5 and 6 indicate that the coefficient on 
lagged exports is not statistically significant, our preferred results are those of Model 5, 
with dyadic fixed effects and controlling for autocorrelation and spatial correlation in 
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the residuals. According to the results obtained in Table 3, the effect of one additional 
vessel hijacked is associated with a decrease in exports of about 1.1% (M4). We also 
tried with export volumes instead of export value, obtaining results similar in magnitude 
and significance. 
Table 3. Baseline results for all trade routes  
In Table 4, we present the results obtained by estimating Equation 3, which includes the 
value of air freight as additional regressor. The estimated coefficient for lxva is not 
statistically significant in the models specified with fixed effects, only in the OLS 
baseline model and in M1, estimated with random effects, is the coefficient negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficient of our target variable, namely piracy, 
remains unchanged. 
Table 4. Break-down of results by specific Trade route (Equation 3) 
Table 5 present the results for each maritime route, we can observe that impact is 
greatest on the route linking Europe to the Sub-Continent, which only includes vessels 
hijacked in regions ES, RGSA and ISCS. 
Table 5. Results by maritime route 
The greater effect of piracy on the Indo-European trade route is hardly surprising when 
the geographical position of the Indian Sub-continent and the recent history of piracy 
events in the region are considered. Because of its geographic position, it is almost 
impossible for ships reaching or leaving India to change maritime routes to avoid 
entirely the part of the Indian Ocean threatened by Somali pirates. This has become all 
the more true as in 2008 and 2009 Somali Pirates broadened the reach of their 
operations to encompass much of the Indian Ocean, practically reaching the Maldives 
Islands (Report of the House of Lords p.11). According to the IMB, 2009 saw an 
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important shift in the location of attacks by Somali pirates. While in 2008 attacks were 
mainly in the Gulf of Aden, in 2009 they were concentrated along the Somali sea-board. 
Figure 4. The Operating area of the Somali Pirates: The Suez Canal and Cape 
Maritime Routes 
5. DISCUSSION: THE COST OF A FAILED STATE 
In this section the estimates obtained in Section 4 are used to simulate the costs of 
piracy for the international community and to compare the case of Somalia with that of 
two other countries, Afghanistan and North Korea, which also generate costs, albeit 
differently, for the international community. 
Some authors argue that Somalia could be better off without a centralized government 
than with its former one (Leeson, 2007; Powell et al, 2008). In what follows, we try to 
shed some light on the question of whether the international community could have an 
interest in maintaining a stateless Somalia. We compare the cost for the international 
community of Somalia as a failed state with a strategic geographic position, with the 
cost of an antagonist state (Afghanistan) and the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea).   
Total trade between Asia and Europe in our sample for the year 2008 was US$ 642 
billion
1
, and the decrease in international trade between Europe and Asia due to 
maritime Piracy was around 28 billion US$ 2008
2
.We also know that the Somali Pirates 
accounted for 91% of all ship and crew hijackings in 2008 (42 out of 46 vessels 
                                                          
1
 Total trade between Europe and Asia           
  
    , n denotes the number of exporting countries, 
m the number of importing countries.   
 
2
 The average increase in t_hijacks over the period 1999 to 2008 is 3.88, this increase has reduced 
exports on average by: 
                              100*                    4.36% 
Cost= 0.0436* 642594927127= 28017138823. 
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hijacked), so we can estimate the cost of Somali Maritime Piracy at 25.49 billion 
dollars. As we don’t take into consideration all the trade transiting the Gulf of Aden, our 
estimation understates the cost of Somali piracy on the Euro-Asian route. To complete 
the picture of the cost of Somali Piracy for the International Community, we should also 
include the cost of maintaining the warships of the International coalition and the 
increased insurance costs for goods passing through the Gulf of Aden. The cost of the 
EU-led operation Atalanta has been estimated at 12.4 million dollars for its first year 
alone (according to the European Committee of the House of Lords). This operation 
represented the main military presence in the region with nine navy ships in 2008. 
Unfortunately, we obtained limited data on insurance premiums charged to shipping 
companies. Consequently, our conservative estimate of the cost of piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden is 25.5 billion dollars. If we add to this figure the cost of the African Union peace 
keeping force maintained in Mogadishu (AMISOM) (816.6 billion dollars
3
) in order to 
guaranty the distribution of humanitarian aid and the cost of this humanitarian aid 
(501.3 billion dollars
4
), the estimated cost of the Somalia conflict for the international 
community in 2008 is 26.8 billion dollars. 
To compare this figure with the costs to the international community originated in 
Afghanistan and North Korea, we take into account the same elements: military and 
humanitarian expenditures, as well as trade destruction caused by these countries. The 
most difficult task was to gather reliable and up to date data. Our sources are the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for costing humanitarian interventions; estimates 
                                                          
3
 Source: African Union Website, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/amisom_Financial.htm. 
 
4
 Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
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from the National Priorities Project for the annual cost of the Afghanistan war; the 2007 
United States Congress Report for an evaluation of the annual cost of protecting the 
northern border of South Korea. The cost of the war in Afghanistan is proxied by the 
cost born by the USA. Although we are aware these data are far from complete, our goal 
is to use the available figures for comparison (Table A.5).  
Figure 5 compares calculated costs for Somalia, Afghanistan and North Korea. It shows 
that the military cost of the U.S. deployment in Afghanistan for the year 2008 (43.4 
billion dollar) is far more important that the cost of the mobilization of 20,000 U.S. 
soldiers in South Korea along the North Korean border (7.5 billion dollars) and 
overshadows completely the cost of the AMISOM and the Atalanta Operations 
combined (0.82 billion dollars). Costs of humanitarian operations in Somalia and 
Afghanistan are similar (US$ 0.476 billion and US$ 0.572 billion, respectively) if we do 
not consider the flow of refugees due to the two conflicts. Once the cost of refugees is 
integrated
5
, the Afghanistan conflict is more expensive in terms of humanitarian 
operations than the Somalia conflict (US$ 0.699 billion and US$ 0.503 billion, 
respectively). The cost of humanitarian operations in Somalia represents more than ten 
times the cost of humanitarian operations in North Korea. We do not consider North 
Korea to be a source of trade destruction. Although this country surely does not trade at 
its full potential, it does not hinder trade between other countries. We have already 
mentioned that Somali Pirates deter US$ 25.5 billion worth of trade flows. However we 
have not found data on trade destruction originating in Afghanistan over the past ten 
years.  
                                                          
5
 See figures in Table A.5 from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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Figure 5. Cost Comparison (to the International Community) of different kinds of 
States (2008) 
From of our back of the envelope calculation, it is clear that the international 
community can co-exist with a quasi-autarkic State since no threat by the latter has 
materialized. The war in Afghanistan is obviously more costly for the International 
community than the situation in Somalia and North Korea. We had in fact expected a 
larger difference between the cost of the Afghan war and that brought about by Somali 
maritime piracy. It would undoubtedly be greater if estimates of the long-term impact of 
the 9/11 terrorist attack on international trade were included, particularly the effects of 
tighter security regulations adopted by many countries after 2001. Mirza and Verdier 
(2008) provided a partial answer to this question for US trade by estimating the impact 
of terrorist acts. They did this by linking the drop in business visas issued to enter the 
US and their consequences for US imports. A negative and significant impact is 
observed five years after the terrorist attack. We tend to think that the negative effect of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not limited to trade with the USA, but also extended to many 
other countries that adopted tighter controls at their borders. It may even be possible 
that countries that have raised security, trade more between themselves and the new 
measures of control have only a transitory effect. Furthermore, these additional controls 
might have led to a reduction in insurance costs for trade between the countries adopting 
them, but further research is definitely needed to shed more light on these issues.     
 
6. Conclusions 
We have applied a gravity model to annual exports from 27 EU countries to 21 
destinations. The effects of piracy incidents were captured by the number of attempts, 
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the number of boarded vessels and the number of hijacked vessels in the three maritime 
routes considered. Two main conclusions emerged. First, not all acts of violence against 
ships hinder international maritime trade, only the most harmful (hijackings) of these 
lower the amount of trade between nations. Second, as most of the incidents of piracy 
involving hijacking are attributed to Somali pirates, it seems reasonable to say that, 
were piracy to disappear in the Gulf of Aden (RSGA region), there would be a slight 
drop in the cost of maritime trade between Asia and Europe. Third, air freight does not 
appear to be a substitute for maritime trade; this result is preliminary, as estimates for 
different type of goods need to be calculated. 
Interestingly, it appears to be the case, that rather than eradicating piracy, the 
International Community has decided to contain it. According to the Commander in 
chief of the joint European Naval Task Force, the naval forces are in a position to deter, 
rather than fully eradicate, piracy, due to the vast expanse of ocean in which the pirates 
operate, as it is impossible to intercept systematically all attempts of piracy. An 
alternative solution would be to send ground forces onto the Somali shore. This option 
has been ruled out because of the human and economic cost it would entail, as 
demonstrated 18 years ago with the US lead operation “Restore Hope”. Yet another 
solution would be to revive an active gunboat policy on the Somali ports such as Eyl 
and Garacad, which are known to be used by pirates. Although this may seem less 
expensive and more feasible, with modern war faring techniques, it would be to ignore a 
key fact in the current Somali political situation: pirates are one of the few organized 
forces capable of opposing the Islamist militia that rules a vast part of the country. 
Weakening the pirates and the two proto-states largely living off the spoils of piracy, 
could lead to a power vacuum in the regions where the Islamist militias are less active. 
A strong Islamist State could be a haven for global terrorist activities and, as recent 
21 
 
history has shown, the economic costs brought about by large scale attacks on western 
soil, through the economic disruption and retaliations they induce, could be extremely 
costly.  
An alternative manageable solution for the International community may be to provide 
strong backing for one of the new Somali proto-states, and start a program for recycling 
pirates as pirate-fighting coast guards. This solution would have the advantage of being 
relatively cheap and creating an area of stability in a strategic region for International 
trade. 
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Figure 1. Maritime Shipping Routes in 2002 
 
Source: http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/. Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. Department of Global Studies and 
Geography, Hofstra University, New York. 
  
Figure 2. Location of piracy acts in 2008 
 
Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 
London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Figure 3. Maritime regions 
 
Source: Self-created using data from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC 
Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Figure 4. Range of Action of the Somali Pirates. Suez Canal and Cape Maritime 
Routes 
 
Source: Self-created using data from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC 
Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the Cost for the International Community of different 
types of States in 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the sources listed in Table A.4; figures are in billions US $. 
  
Table 1. Acts of piracy on the Europe- South East Asia Route by type  
Year Type of incidents  
boarded hijacked attempt Total 
1997 100 15 23 138 
1998 90 14 31 135 
1999 169 12 46 227 
2000 235 6 130 371 
2001 145 18 75 238 
2002 152 26 60 238 
2003 180 17 88 285 
2004 134 9 63 206 
2005 111 23 59 193 
2006 104 13 50 167 
2007 98 13 56 167 
2008 81 46 80 207 
2009 153 49 84 406 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using data from the IMB Piracy Reporting Center, the International 
Maritime Bureau, and the ICC Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Table 2. Statistical Summary 
Variable Obs Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
LX 4755 16.22 3.17 3.74 23.91 
LXAair 5171 15.15 3.68 0.69 22.88 
LYHi 5628 9.71 0.90 7.35 11.62 
LYHj 5130 7.64 1.65 5.35 10.77 
LPOPi 5670 15.88 1.43 12.87 18.23 
LPOPj 5400 17.55 1.79 13.21 21.01 
LDist 5670 9.03 0.25 8.20 9.81 
T_HIJACK 5670 15.66667 11.76795 1 46 
T_BOARDED 5670 113.8111 57.0805 34 246 
T_ATTEMPT 5670 58.73704 28.63038 12 137 
T_TOT 5670 188.2148 83.50224 48 391 
Note: L represents natural logarithms, X and LXair the value of maritime and air trade respectively; YHi 
and YHj express per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of exporter and importer countries; Popi and 
Popj are the respective populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, T_BOARDED and 
T_ATTEMPT is the total number of ships hijacked, boarded and suffering attempts of piracy.  
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Table 3. Baseline results for all trade routes  
 OLS RE FE FE,AR(1) FE, Spatial 
C. 
GMM,FE GMM,FD 
 Baseline M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6   
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t   
LYHi 1.125*** 0.813*** 0.627*** 0.389*** 0.627*** 0.415*** 0.356 
 55.039 19.826 4.611 2.67 4.183 2.7 1.641 
LYHj 1.281*** 0.614*** 0.863*** 0.531*** 0.863*** 0.416*** 0.226 
 37.406 13.025 8.541 3.818 11.703 2.8 0.84 
LPOPi 0.896*** 0.859*** -2.081** 0.232 -2.081* 0.04 0.235 
 50.227 21.736 -2.408 0.989 -1.828 0.045 0.124 
LPOPj 1.156*** 1.127*** -4.388*** 0.157 -4.388*** -3.065*** -6.015**  
 64.268 23.874 -4.532 0.631 -5.355 -2.881 -2.346 
LDist -0.351*** 0.994***                    
 -3.231 3.476                    
L2.T_HIJACK -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.005** -0.004**  
 -3.37 -5.363 -4.09 -3.041 -5.736 -2.244 -2.135 
COMLANG_OFF 0.492*** 0.864**                    
 3.884 2.345                    
COLONY 0.510*** 0.697                    
 5.052 1.586                    
L.LX      0.197 -0.046 
      1.409 -0.463 
CONSTANT -36.196*** -38.355*** 110.107*** 1.614***   0.066 
 -33.681 -13.667 5.801 3.623   1.265 
R2 WITHIN  0.739 0.152   0.145 0.023 
R2 0.777  0.231 0.312    
Nobs 3494 3494 3494 3003 3494 2802 2377 
LL -6344.085  -3978.446 -3113.288  -2596.522 -2837.674 
RMSE 1.489 0.847 0.816 0.683  0.664 0.798 
Hansen test      2.288 1.455 
Probab.      0.130 0.228 
AIC 12708.170 . 7968.891 6238.576 . 5205.044 5689.348 
BIC 12769.76 . 8005.844 6274.62 . 5240.672 5729.763 
Source: Self-created 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. L is for natural logarithms, X and LXair are 
the value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of 
exporter and importer countries respectively; Popi and Popj are country populations; Dist is distance 
between countries; T_HIJACK, the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL 
are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and 
when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. is the appropriate variable in year t-2 
(second lag) and L. is for year t-1 (first lag). FD indicates that the model has been estimated with the 
respective variable in first differences. 
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Table 4. Break-down by specific Trade route (Equation 3) 
 OLS  RE  FE  FE,AR(1) FE, Spatial 
C. 
GMM,FE  GMM,FD  
 Baseline m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6  
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
LYHi 1.122*** 0.818*** 0.636*** 0.563*** 0.636*** 0.463*** 0.36 
 52.786 19.465 4.6 4.014 3.431 2.983 1.588 
LYHj 1.279*** 0.629*** 0.845*** 0.303** 0.845*** 0.401*** 0.217 
 37.092 12.947 8.086 2.22 10.33 2.652 0.808 
LPOPi 0.865*** 0.862*** -2.137** 0.536*** -2.137** -0.172 0.099 
 44.836 20.239 -2.385 2.856 -2.087 -0.184 0.05 
LPOPj 1.189*** 1.150*** -4.279*** -0.096 -4.279*** -2.958** -5.194* 
 64.764 23.651 -4.185 -0.471 -4.414 -2.551 -1.912 
LDist -0.398*** 1.032***      
 -3.437 3.47      
L2.T_HIJACK -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.005** 
 -3.359 -5.028 -3.651 -2.44 -6.719 -2.32 -2.233 
COMLANG_OFF 0.499*** 0.783**      
 3.808 2.088      
COLONY 0.363*** 0.572      
 3.482 1.28      
LXAir -0.024*** -0.043*** 0 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 
 -2.983 -3.445 0.031 -0.325 0.04 -0.016 0.312 
L.LX      0.192 -0.024 
      1.405 -0.217 
CONSTANT -35.284*** -38.628*** 109.616*** 1.306***  0.063  
 -30.989 -13.118 5.593 4.13  1.145  
R2 WITHIN   0.152   0.145 0.023 
R2 0.777 0.739 0.231 0.312    
Nobs 3298 3298 3298 2818 3298 2658 2215 
LL -5925.716  -3685.382 -2826.735  -2408.501 -2614.256 
RMSE 1.461 0.829 0.801 0.661  0.652 0.788 
Hansen test      2.322 1.963 
Probab.      0.128 0.161 
AIC 11871.43 . 7384.764 5667.471 . 4831.003 5244.511 
BIC 11932.44 . 7427.472 5709.077 . 4872.2 5290.136 
Note: t-statistics were calculated using robust standard errors. L indicates natural logarithms, X and LXair 
express the value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are for per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the exporter and importer countries; Popi and Popj express country populations; Dist is distance 
between countries; T_HIJACK is the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL 
are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and 
when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. expresses the respective variable in 
year t-2 (second lag) and L. the variable in year t-1 (first lag). FD means that the model has been 
estimated with the respective variable in first differences. 
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Table 5. Results by maritime route 
FE with ar(1) and spatial 
correlations 
Europe - Indian Sub Continent 
 m2 
Europe - South East Asia 
 m3 
Europe - East Asia  
m1 
 b/t b/t b/t 
LYHi 0.584*** 0.423** 1.095*** 
 3.322 2.246 4.198 
LYHj 1.544*** 0.344** 0.827*** 
 10.21 2.172 8.209 
LPOPi -6.333*** 2.982*** -12.538** 
 -8.853 4.027 -2.556 
LPOPj -3.980** -6.689*** -0.091 
 -2.198 -5.982 -0.085 
L2.T_HIJACK -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.006** 
 -10.177 -5.085 -2.244 
LXAir 0.005 -0.007 0.001 
 0.219 -0.422 0.061 
CONSTANT 174.326*** 64.604*** 230.347** 
 8.569 3.356 2.314 
R2_WITHIN 0.182 0.115 0.239 
Nobs 1116 1427               755 
    
Note: t-statistics are reported, calculated using robust standard errors. L expresses natural logarithms, X 
and LXair represents the value of maritime and air trade respectively; and YHi and YHj are for per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the exporter and the importer country respectively; Popi and Popj 
express the respective populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, is the total number of 
ships hijacked.  COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy variables that take the value of one when 
the countries have a common official language and when they had a colonial relationship in the past, 
respectively; L2. means it is the variable in year t-2 (second lag). 
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APPENDIX 1  
Graph A1. Total number of incidents on the three maritime routes. 
 
Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 
London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
  
APPENDIX 2 
Table A1. Maritime Region Navigated according to each trade route. 
Maritime Route Maritime regions navigated 
European Seas 
(ES) 
Red Sea/ Gulf 
of Aden 
(RGSA) 
Indian Sub 
Continental 
Seas (ISCS) 
South East 
Asian Seas 
(SEAS) 
East Asian 
Seas (SEC) 
Europe - Indian Sub 
Continent 
X X X   
Europe - South East Asia X X X X  
Europe - East Asia X X X X X 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Table A.2 Sources and variables 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
Xij : Maritime Exports from i to j Nominal X Eurostat 
   
Independent Variables Description Source 
Yi : Exporter’s income Exporter’s GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
Yj : Importer’s income Importer’s GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
t_boarded number of ships boarded by pirates 
on a particular route 
IMB 
t_hijack number of ships hijacked by pirates 
on a particular route 
IMB 
t_attempt number of attempted piracy acts on 
a particular route 
IMB 
t_tot number of piracy acts on a 
particular route 
IMB 
Distij : Distance Distances between country capitals 
of trading partners (km) 
CEPII  
Comlang_off Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners share the same official 
language 
CEPII  
Colonyij :  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners had colonial links in the 
past, 0 otherwise 
CEPII  
Note: WDI denotes the World Bank Indicators, IBM denotes the International Maritime Bureau and 
CEPII the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table A3. List of exporter and importer countries 
European Countries Asian Countries and Australia 
AUSTRIA AUSTRALIA 
BELGIUM (and LUXBG -> 1998) BANGLADESH 
BULGARIA BHUTAN 
CYPRUS CAMBODIA (ex KAMPUCHEA) 
CZECH REPUBLIC (CS->1992) CHINA (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF) 
DENMARK HONG KONG 
ESTONIA INDIA 
FINLAND INDONESIA (ID+TP from 77,excl. TP -> 2001) 
FRANCE JAPAN 
GERMANY (incl DD from 1991) KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH KOREA) 
GREECE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LAOS) 
HUNGARY MALAYSIA 
IRELAND MYANMAR (BURMA) 
ITALY NEPAL 
LATVIA PAKISTAN 
LITHUANIA PHILIPPINES 
LUXEMBOURG SINGAPORE 
MALTA SRI LANKA (ex CEYLAN) 
NETHERLANDS TAIWAN 
POLAND THAILAND 
PORTUGAL VIETNAM (excl. NORTH -> 1976) 
ROMANIA  
SLOVAKIA  
SLOVENIA  
SPAIN  
SWEDEN  
UNITED KINGDOM  
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APPENDIX 5 
Table A.4 Sources and variables used in section 5 
Variables description Country Source 
cost in 
million US 
dollars 
Cost of humanitarian 
Intervention  
  
 
 
Afghanistan 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
572 
 
Afghanistan 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
127.5* 
 
North Korea 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
48 
 
North Korea 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
0* 
 
Somalia 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
476 
 
Somalia 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
25.3* 
Cost of military 
intervention 
   
 
Afghanistan Costofwar.com 43400 
 
North Korea United State congress report (2007) 7500 
 
Somalia 
African Union website and House of Lord 
European Committee 
816.6 
 
Somalia 
European Committee of the House of Lords 
(Atalanta) 
12.4 
Trade destruction 
   
 
Afghanistan ?  ? 
 
North Korea Authors estimate 0 
 
Somalia Authors estimate 25495 
*This figures result from a calculation of the authors made from Data of the UNHCR Global Report 
2008. Number of refugees assisted by the UNHCR for Somalia, Afghanistan and North Korea (459253, 
1718155 and 0 respectively), cost of UNHCR operation by region (US$ 259.7 billion for East and Horn 
of Africa and US$ 221.8 billion for Asia respectively) and the number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons by region (2.9 million in Asia and 4.7 million in East and Horn of Africa) can be found 
in the report.  We have calculated the cost per persons assisted by UNHCR and multiplied by the number 
of refugees for the concern regions. 
